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ABSTRACT 
In both the United States and Great Britain, legislators 
are surprisingly popular despite the inefficacy of government policies 
and the worsening of economic conditions. The answer to this small 
puzzle lies in the determinants of legislative popularity. In this 
paper we show that legislative popularity in both countries is 
significantly related to constituency oriented activites such as 
handling constituents' problems, . maintaining a high visibility in the 
constituency, defending the special interests of the district, and the 
like. We propose a three equation structural model which explains the 
formation of (1 ) name recognition, (2)  the general expectation that 
the legislator is a dependable constituency man, and ( 3) the final 
assessment of the legislator's performance itself. The data we employ 
come from the 1978 CPS/NES Congressional Elections Study and from a 
1979 British Election survey conducted by Gallup for our purposes. 
WHAT MAKES LEGISLATORS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES POPULAR? 
Bruce E. Cain, John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina 
One of the more interesting findings of modern survey 
research is that constituents hold their elected representatives 
in high regard even though when acting collectively those representatives 
are unsuccessful in solving major national problems which affect their 
constituents' welfare.1 In the United States, for example, inflation 
rages on and the term "national energy policy" is but a modern equivalent 
of the Holy Grail . Similarly, in Great Britain, the economy stagnates 
and labor unrest continues apace. Yet in both countries electors give 
their legislators high marks . The 1978 CPS/NES Congressional Election 
Study reveals that 46 percent of the American electorate ranks their 
Representative's performance as "very good" or "good," and the ratio 
of favorable to unfavorable ratings is on the order of 11/1 . British 
MPs do not fare quite so well; still, a survey conunissioned immediately 
following the May 1979 elections reports 35 percent positive ratings , 
and a postive to negative ratio of 7/2. Even granting the substantial 
intercountry difference,  citizens in these post-industrial democracies 
do indeed seem to like their representatives. 
In and of themselves job ratings are not of critical interest. 
One could rate one's representative highly and cheerfully vote against 
him or her on grounds of policy disagreement, party loyalty or whatever. 
But a quick look at the data dispels such notions. As Table 1 shows,
2 
ratings of representatives' job performance have a strong association 
with the vote. In the U . S .  case those who rate their representative's 
performance as very good show a near certain probability of electoral 
support. The only surprise in the table is the relatively high level 
of support among those critical (a small number to be sure) of the 
representative' s performance. The relationship between approval and 
voting for the incumbent Member of Parliament is about as strong as 
that for Congressmen though the range of support is displaced downward 
on the scale . The point, however, is simply that there is a strong 
even if slightly different -- relationship between incwnbent job 
ratings and the vote in both countries. 
[Table 1 here] 
This paper explores the bases of the American and British 
electorates' ratings of their respective legislators. The similarities 
in the electoral sytems of the two nations ( i . e .  geographically 
located single-member districts, plurality rule) lead us to suspect 
similar grounds for incumbent performance ratings in both countries . 
But our approach of course is flexible enough to permit intercountry 
differences to emerge. Our analysis goes beyond the existing 
literature in two respects: its comparative focus, and its 
exploitation of two new and highly appropriate data sets. 
In November of 1978 the Center for Political Studies of 
the University of Michigan in cooperation with a co111I11ittee of 
interested scholars carried out an extensive congressional election 
study. The survey included a number of new items designed to elicit 
voter reactions to incumbents -- name recognition, contacts , service, 
TABLE 1 
INCUMBENT JOB RATINGS AND THE VOTE 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 
(ns in parenthesis) 
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United States Great Britain 
Very Good 98 % (184) 63 % (200)
Good 90 (374) 53 (353) 
Fair 65 (187) 43 ( 311) 
Poor 25 ( 28) 25 ( 89) 
Very Poor 43 ( 7 )  14 ( 44) 
Don't Know 7 1  ( 99) 36 ( 436) 
Item: In general, how would you rate the job that your U. S. 
Representative (Member of Parliament) 
has been doing -- very good, good, fair, poor or very 
poor? 
appropriate activities, as well as information on the comparative 
issue and ideological positions of the congressional candidates . 
In the spring of 1979 we contracted with Social Surveys Limited 
(British Gallup) to include a number of these newer items on a 
survey following the May election. These two surveys, conducted 
only seven months apart and including highly comparable items con-
stitute the· data base for the analysis which follows. The exact 
wording of the new items used in this paper appears in the appendix. 
Sources of Legislator Approval 
Why should citizens rate their legislators highly? 
The first answer which comes to mind is that suggested by classic 
democratic theory: a legislator earns the approval of his or her 
constituents by faithfully representing them in the legislature. 2 
This suggestion has been out of fashion for some two decades now. 
In their seminal study of congressional representation Stokes and 
Miller reported data which seemed to indicate a dismally ignorant 
3 congressional electorate . Over half the voters had not heard or 
read anything about either candidate, only a "chemical trace" of 
citizens explained their votes by reference to legislative issues, 
etc. In all likelihood, however, such research has underestimated 
the knowledge and awareness of the legislative electorate. The 
basic problem lies in the use of a spontaneous name recall item 
as a filter for exploring citizens' perceptions of the candidates, 
i.e. only those who could recall the candidates' names were asked 
any further questions. In the 1978 study only 12 percent of the 
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respondents could recall the names of both candidates, but 40 percent 
could recognize the names of both. Furthermore, rather than wait 
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for them to volunteer the information , the 1978 study invited citizens 
to provide a general appraisal of the incumbent's voting record; over 
40 percent of them consented to do so. 
Still, even if citizens know more about their representatives' 
policy positions and legislative activities than previously believed, 
there is fairly convincing evidence that such knowledge is not the 
basis of their favorable evaluations of those representatives. In an 
examination of citizen evaluations Parker and Davidson found that only a 
minute proportion of the citizenry offers policy or performance based 
reasons for their judgments. 4 Rather, evaluations center on personal 
qualities and constituency service. 
Such findings indicate that modern electorates are aware 
that traditional democratic theory does not provide a very accurate 
description of contemporary legislators' activities . In a world in 
which national governments participate actively in the social and 
economic realms two other familiar legislative roles now take on 
greater significance than previously.5 As the amount of money and
services disbursed by national governments has grown , the expectation 
that legislators should procure an "appropriate" share of it for 
their districts also has grown. In earlier times such efforts were 
grouped under the heading of "pork barrel" politics, but the term is 
too narrow today . Suffice it to say that the modern legislator plays 
an important role as a broker or facilitator of national activities 
important to local social , economic and governmental interests. 
Probably legislators have happily embraced this expansion of a 
traditional role -- they publicize their efforts widely. 6 That such 
efforts do not go unappreciated is reflected in the 1978 CPS study : 
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20 percent of the respondents claimed they could remember "something 
special" the incumbent had done for the district , a category of 
responses heavily colored by money-channelling activities. In the 
British sample 13 percent recalled some particularistic achievement 
of the MP, a surprisingly high figure given the relative powerless-
ness of the MP. 
A second consequence of the growth of national governments 
is the increase in direct contacts between ordinary citizens and 
those governments. Whether attempting to take advantage of a parti-
cular program or trying to elude some particular set of requirements 
or regulations, citizens increasingly must deal with government 
bureaucracies. This trend has probably led to an expansion in 
another familiar role of legislators , that of the ombudsman , a 
champion of constituent interests against the decisions of national 
agencies. There are a variety of indicators suggestive of increasing 
activity of this kind , including the rapid expansion of congressional 
staffs, district office allotments, etc. In Great Britain as well 
there are pressures along these lines. 7 Again , the expansion of the 
ombudsman role has probably been an electoral boon to legislators. 
In the 1978 CPS Study 15 percent of the respondents reported they 
had contacted their Representatives , about two-thirds of these to 
seek information or help with a problem. In Great Britain the data 
show that 8 percent of the respondents have written to their MP ,  and, 
as one might expect in a system with strong party discipline , few of 
these communications concerned a policy stand -- 80 percent of them 
requested information or help with a problem. We should add that in 
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both countries citizens who contacted their representatives were 
overwhelmingly satisfied with the response they received. About 75 
percent of these respondents in the United Kingdom report good or 
"very good" response, and more than 90 percent.of the American 
respondents gave the same ratings. 
The multiplicity of roles modern legislators are expected 
to play is nicely illustrated by the responses to the following item: 
"Here is a list of some of the activities that occupy members of 
(Congress, Parliament) as part of their job. We want to know how you 
feel about the importance (MCs, MPs) should give these activities". 
The response categories (see appendix) summarize the lawmaking, pork 
barrel, ombudsman, oversight, and informational-educational activities 
of legislators. Responses appear in Table 2. 
[Table 2 here] 
If we treat lawmaking and oversight as the programmatic activity 
emphasized by classic democratic theory, we see that only about a 
third of Americans and a sixth of the British give pre-eminence to 
such activities.8 Perhaps most significantly , more than a quarter 
of the citizens in each country feel it most important simply that 
their legislator keep in touch about what the government (them?) is 
doing. The significance of these findings is that it is "easier" 
for legislators to earn approval as ombudsmen , pork barrelers , and 
information sources than as lawmakers. In matters of distributive 
politics modern legislatures tend to adopt universalistic procedures 
and allow legislators the opportunity to claim credit for that which 
everyone gets anyway.9 Similarly, all that is required to be a good 
ombudsman or a good information provider is to make the effort. 
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TABLE 2 
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF MOST IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY 
United States Great Britain 
Ombudsman 12 % 19 
Protecting Constituency 16 26 
or District Interests 
Oversight 15 5 
Information 31 24  
Lawmaking 20 11 
(Debating and Voting) 
All equal 5 10  
9 
Congressmen in particular have access to staffs who can handle most 
routine case work, and as for keeping in touch, both MPs and congress-
men simply need to be willing to invest the time this entails. Activ-
ities such as these are noncontroversial. What fragmentary data we 
have, for example, indicate that most people are pleased with efforts 
in their behalf even if such efforts have no tangible impact. The 
effort itself matters. In contrast, lawmaking is inherently 
controversial; on most issues most legislators will make significant 
numbers of enemies no matter how conscientiously they do their job. 
Thus, any shift in popular expectations away from lawmaking to other 
roles should be expected to enhance the public's satisfaction with 
their representatives. 
There are still other suggestions as to why modern legislators 
are so popular. Good government groups simply point to the 
communications that legislators shower on their constituents (57 
percent of the British respondents and 76 percent of the Americans 
report some type of contact or communication from their representa-
tive) . This explanation presumes that communication builds name 
recognition which in turn produces support. It is not a very subtle 
theory. In contrast, Fenno argues that the continuing efforts of 
congressmen to present themselves to their constituents should be 
viewed as attempts to build trust among those constituents, 
to develop expectations that the congressmen would be helpful even 
if the occasion has not yet arisen, and to promote beliefs that the 
congressmen is speaking for constituents even if they are not aware 
of all the details at all times . 10 
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Indeed, the majority of respondents in both countries exhibited 
a belief that their representative would be helpful if they requested 
his or her aid. In the United Kingdom 56 percent said they expected 
their MP to be "very helpful" or "somewhat helpful" while in the United 
States the comparable statistic was 61 percent. Only 11 percent of the 
British respondents and 13 percent of those in the American sample 
expected their legislator to be "not very helpful". 
To summarize, the relevant hypotheses about the basis of 
positive evaluations of modern legislators generally deny that 
these legislators are evaluated principally on policy grounds. Instead, 
such hypotheses claim that voters approve ( 1 )  familiar names, or ( 2) 
other more tangible, though nonprogrammatic activities such as district 
service and constituent assistance, and/or (3)  trusted individuals who 
have contacted them and provided them with relevant information. The 
two sets of survey data we have enable us to examine in a �easonably 
direct wa� each of the major hypotheses. The variables and methods 
of analysis are the concern of the next section. 
Measures and Methods 
Each of the hypotheses discussed in the preceding section 
is represented by one or more items in our surveys (see appendix) . 
One item asks about contacts and communications between incumbents 
and their constituents, both of a personal kind (meetings and talks 
with incumbents or their staff) and the more impersonal variety (mail, 
mass media) . Another item inquires about the contacts constituents 
themselves initiate, whether to express opinions or request help. 
Constituents are asked whether they can remembl'r anything special the 
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incumbent has done for the district -- a request which should bring to 
mind the representative's broker/facilitator role. There is an item in 
the American survey which inquires about the respondent's general 
perception of the incumbent's voting record. Even Fenno's concern with 
trust and expectations of accessibility is reflected in the afore-
mentioned item which asks how helpful the incumbent would be if the 
citizen had a problem. In addition to the voting record item in the 
American survey, party indentification provides some indication of 
programmatic agreement or disagreement with the Representative. The 
American survey also contains a variety of seven point scales on which 
the respondent is asked to place himself/herself and the congressional 
candidates, but these are not very useful because (1) retiring or 
unopposed incumbents are not placed on the scales, (2) a large number 
of respondents (typically about 1100) do not know each candidate's 
stand. Thus, any multivariate analysis which uses these items founders 
on missing data problems. Such items are not included on the British 
survey. Finally, the collective performance items of the parent 
legislative body is the subject of an item in both the American and 
British surveys. 
One could simply include all the preceding items in an 
analysis of incumbent performance ratings; eventually, we will do 
this. But the analysis should be somewhat subtler. For example, 
proponents of the name recognition thesis claim that recognition 
is a function of the communications resources available to incumbents. 
We can examine this claim directly. Furthermore, trust in one's 
representative presumably arises from familiarity with him or her, 
previous observations of his or her performance, and perhaps party 
affiliation or policy agr�ement. Job performance ratings, finally, 
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should be functions of all the aforementioned factors, some of which 
may work directly, others only indirectly through name recognition 
and expectations of access. 
Our analysis therefore focuses on three dependent variables :  
name recognition, expectations o f  access, and perfonnance ratings. The 
purpose is to test for significant direct and indirect interactions 
between these variables, various types of constituency service and other 
relevant variables. 11 Given that each of these variables is dichotomous 
or ordinal, statistical problems arise if standard regression methods 
are employed. Therefore, we employ a maximum likelihood probit procedure 
for estimating the statistical models. 12 
The Recognition Equation 
The CPS survey measures name recognition via the familiar 
1 3  feeling thermometer. A list of names is offered t o  the respondent who 
is asked to rate how warmly he or she feels about each person. The 
respondent is explicitly requested not to rate unfamiliar persons: "If 
we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to 
rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one.1114
The incumbent is not identified as such, and the rating is elicited before 
any other questions about Congress are asked. More than 80 percent of 
� 
the respondents rated the incumbent. These are scored l; the remaining 
20 percent are scored 0. Thus, we are trying to account for responses 
to an extremely skewed dependent variable. Table 3 (first column) 
presents an estimation of the name recognition equation. 
[Table 3 here] 
On the whole the estimates reveal a plausible picture. 
TABLE 3 
NAME RECOGNITION AND NAME RECALL 
Personal Contact 
Impersonal Contact 
Secondhand Contact 
Citizen-Initiated Contact 
Secondhand Citizen­
Initiated Contact 
District Service 
Voting 
Record 
{Satisfactory 
SW Satisfactory 
Neutral 
Unsatisfactory 
Year Elected 
Committee Chair 
Subcouunittee Chair 
Government Position 
Independent 
No Party ID 
Same Party ID 
R_2 
n 
United States 
Recognition 
. 57** 
1. 08**
. 32** 
. 65** 
. 52** 
. 57** 
. 99** 
. 68** 
. 3 7** 
. 73** 
-. 01* 
.OS 
.04 
. 06 
. 14 
. 60 
2 , 179 
United States 
Recall 
. 28** 
. 72** 
. 18* 
. 18* 
. 11* 
. 18* 
. 61** 
. 56** 
. 10 
• 69**
. 02** 
. 46** 
.16* 
-. 15 
. 12 
. 34 
2 , 190 
13 
Great Britain 
Recall 
. 45** 
. 6 5** 
. 22** 
. 0 7  
. 16 
. 48** 
. 01** 
. 0 7  
-
-. 24** 
.06 
. 22 
1 , 585 
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Citizens who have been contacted by the incumbent are significantly 
more likely to recognize his/her name than those not contacted. 
Though the estimates appear to show that personal contacts are 
less important than less personal ones,  this result is deceptive: 
nearly everyone personally contacted has also received a less personal 
contact (46 1 of 50 7). Thus, those personally contacted generally have 
a combined contact coefficient of 1. 6 5  v. 1. 08 for those not personally 
contacted. Citizen-initiated contacts also are statistically important, 
and other analyses not reported indicate that the nature of such 
contacts makes no difference. Finally, notice that the "ripple effects" 
of any kind of contact are statistically significant: the contacts 
experienced by a citizen's friends and relatives increase the 
probability that he recognizes the incumbent • 
Impressions of an incumbent's voting record also bear a 
strong relation to name recognition. The omitted reference category 
is the group which has no impression. Relative to the unaware , both 
those satisfied and those dissatisfied are significantly more likely 
to recognize the incumbent's name. Although the finding is completely 
expected, there is some causal ambiguity about it: perhaps those 
contacted by the incumbent both recognize the name and form an 
impression of the voting record as a result of the content of the 
contact. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the incumbent's formal position in 
Congress makes no difference for name recognition. On the other hand 
simple seniority does: the earlier a Congressman was elected the 
better known he/she is. Seniority and formal position are of course 
related, bul no doubt seniority reflects the cumulative efforts of 
incumbents in all areas -- contacts , service , voting etc. The other 
surprise among the measures of objective characteristics is the lack 
of importance of party ID for name recognition. Ceteris Paribus, 
whether or not a citizen shares the incumbent's party affiliation 
15 
makes little difference in the probability of recognizing the latter's 
name. 
We have no name recognition measure on the British survey 
(thermometers not being a standard part of British Gallup's.repetoire) , 
but there is a rough way of examining it through use of the name recall 
items. As mentioned, the latter underestimate the extent of awareness 
of legislative candidates, 15 but perhaps the underestimate is across 
the board rather than systematic. If so, an estimated name recall 
equation should bear a "proportionate" resemblance to a name recognition 
equation. And if that is true for the United States, for which we have 
both measures, we would have some confidence that name recognition in 
Great Britain bears a similar resemblance to name recall there . The 
second and third columns of Table 3 contain such an analysis. In the 
second column we report the estimates of an American equation indentical 
to the first except that name recall substitutes for name recognition 
as the dependent variable (correct recall equals 1, 0 otherwise) . 
The third equation is analogous to the second except that it is estimated 
with the British data. 
As a comparison of the first two columns shows, the 
equations are not as similar as one might wish . Contacts and voting 
record continue to have highly significant ef f�ts and the relative 
sizes of these coefficients are similar except for citizen initiated 
contacts which appear rather weak in the recall equation. The two 
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equations are also similar in that party affiliations appear unrelated 
to incumbent name recognition. There is a noteworthy difference 
between the recall and recognition equations, however, when it comes 
to formal position of the incumbent. So far as spontaneous name recall 
is concerned, formal position matters. And whether because of this 
or not we cannot say, the related seniority variable reverses sign 
between the two equations . We will not dwell on such differences 
except to note that the slippage between recognition and recall 
apparently has some systematic components. 
The British recall equation resembles the American one in 
that personal, impersonal and secondhand contacts are significantly 
related to a higher probability of recalling the incumbent's name. 
So is recollection of some service the MP has performed for the district. 
And the puzzling finding of the American equation re-occurs: the more 
recent the MP's elections, the more likely are constituents to recall 
his name. There are some intercountry differences, however. One is 
that citizen initiated contacts show no relation to recall. Another 
is the apparent unimportance of positions in the national government. 
Still another is the presence in the British data of at least some 
degree of partisan effects: those choosing to identify with no party 
-- major or minor -- are significantly less likely to recall the MP's 
name. 16 Possibly there is an analogous tendency in the American data, 
however, in the negative though insignificant coeffieienct attached 
to independents. 
Of course, it is impossible to say what the equation would 
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look like if we had the less demanding name recognition variable. 
Nonetheless, the role of constituency-oriented activities in increasing 
the recall of British incumbents is quite impressive. 
The Expectation of Access Equation 
We have seen that name recognition relates in the expected 
manner to the obvious variables. By making use of their plentiful 
resources American incumbents can achieve a very high level of 
recognition. But to what end? Do votes follow directly from 
recognition as Ralph Nader , Common Cause and other such organizations 
appear to argue? Or is recognition merely an indicator -- and an 
imperfect one at that -- of other electoral factors? Certainly, 
high name recognition resulting from a sex scandal (former Utah 
Representative Allan Howe) , Korean payoffs (former California 
Representative John McFall) the "wrong" position on a major policy 
issue (former Arkansas Representative Brooks Hays on school 
integration, former Iowa Senator Dick Clark on abortion , etc . )  
is something most incumbents would just as soon do without. 
Names are recognized for a reason (s) , even if voters may have 
difficulty remembering and/or articulating the reason (s) .  Fenno , 
for example, might argue that high name recognition usually indicates 
an incumbent who has "reached" a large proportion of his constituency. 
The mailings, the appearances -- all the myriad efforts to "present 
himself" to the district -- will produce high recognition, but the 
electoral pay"ff will be due more to the substance of the incumbent's 
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efforts. This would include the creation of trust, the formation of 
expectations that the incumbent is there to help if needed, and the 
reinforcement of beliefs that the incumbent is "of" the constituency. 17 
There is one item in both the CPS and British surveys which 
touches on such considerations. The item inquires how helpful the 
voter thinks the incumbent would be if the voter had a problem the 
incumbent could do something about. Of course, we would expect 
positive expectations to reflect actual experience, personal and second­
hand, with the incumbent. In addition party and/or policy agreement 
might bear on expectations of incumbent receptivity to constituent 
problems . But if Fenno type arguments are accurate we would anticipate 
that positive expectations would result as well from the contacts that 
incumbents have with constituents and the name recognition resulting 
from those contacts. Table 4 contains the relevant analyses. 
[Table 4 here] 
The table offers a reasonable picture. The first two equations 
are estimated with the American data, one using name recognition, one 
using name recall. As seen, the estimates are vitually identical. 
Incumbent contacts, personal and secondhand, have an effect on 
constituent expectations over and above their effects through name 
recognition ( name recall). The same is true for knowledge of any 
service the incumbent has performed for the district. Conversely, 
name recognition (recall) has effects on citizen expectations beyond 
the influences channeled through it (Table 3) . Perceptions of the 
incumbent's voting record also have a direct effect on citizen 
expectation. Those approaching the record have confidence the incumbent 
TABLE 4 
EXPECTATIONS OF INCUMBENT HELPFULNESS (EIH) , 
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 
Personal Contact 
Impersonal Contact 
Secondhand Contact 
Citizen 
Initiated 
Contact 
{Very Satisfied 
SW Satisfied 
Not Satisfied 
s:c�ndhand {Satisfied 
Citizen- SW S . f" d Initiated atis ie 
Contact Not Satisfied 
District Service 
Name Recognition 
Name Recall 
Independent 
No Party ID 
Other Party ID 
Same Party ID 
Voting 
Record 
{Approve 
SW Approve 
Neutral 
Disapprove 
Year Elected 
R.2 
rho 
n 
U. S. EIH 
with Recog. 
. 13* 
.23** 
. 19** 
. 96** 
- . 27* 
-1. 33* 
. 45** 
. 22 
-. 91** 
. 28** 
. 27** 
- . 15 
. 0 3  
. 92** 
. 36** 
-. 29** 
-. 57** 
. 00 
. 41 
. 46 
1,572 
** p < . 01; * p < .05; t p < . 10. 
U. S. EIH 
with Recall 
. 13* 
. 27** 
. 19** 
. 9 5** 
-. 27* 
-1. 38** 
. 45** 
. 21 
-. 91** 
. 29** 
. 12* 
-. 14 
. 0 3  
. 92** 
. 36** 
-. 29** 
-. 57** 
. 00 
. 41 
. 47 
1,578 
19 
G.B. EIH 
with Recal1 
.51** 
. 22** 
-.07 
. 99** 
-.30 
-1. 25** 
. 9 4** 
. 0 7  
- . 6 3 
. 62** 
. 05 
. 21 
- . 35t 
. 44** 
. oo
. 34 
. 36 
1,058 
20 
would be there in a pinch, while those faulting the record are 
significantly less likely to expect help than the 60 percent who have 
no knowledge of the voting record. 
The most striking coefficients in the table, however , are 
those attached to the variables representing past services rendered 
by the incumbent. That expectations should reflect reality is not at 
all surprising, but the magnitude of the effects does make one sit up 
and take notice. Satisfied constituents are much more likely to have 
positive expectations about the incumbent than those having no personal 
experience. And if anything , the effects of unsatisfactory experiences 
are even stronger. We should point out too that constituents over-
whelmingly report that the contacts they initiate with incumbents 
eventuate in satisfactory experiences :  of 344 individuals i n  the 
American sample who initiated a contact, only 14 were "not satisfied, " 
and only 19 "somewhat dissatisfied, " while more than 200 were "very 
satisfied." All in all then, the Congressman's service activity 
contributes very positively to his image • 
Two null findings deserve mention. First , though seniority 
has some influence (inconsistent) on name recognition and recall, it 
has no direct influence on constituents' expectations of access 
(presumably though, some indirect influence exists, since the longer 
a representative is in office, the more actual services he/she render, 
ceteris paribus) . Second , sharing the incumbent's party affiliation 
has no relationship whatsoever to constituent perceptions that he/she 
would help with a personal problem. The information-service activities 
of the incumbent apparently are perceived in completely non-partisan 
18 
terms by the American electorate. 
21 
Turning now to the British data, we see a picture similar to 
that just described except for one major particular: in Great Britain 
expectations of access are clearly related to party identification. 
Constituents who share the incumbent's affiliation are significantly 
more likely to expect that his/her help would be forthcoming if needed. 
Moreover, splinter party identifiers are marginally less likely to 
expect help from the incumbent than those who hold more standard party 
affiliations. Thus, when it comes to a non-ideological, non-programmatic 
legislative activity -- constituent assistance -- a major difference 
between the British and American cases emerges : party affiliations 
affect constituent expectations in Great Britain but not in the 
United States. 
Of course, there are plausible reasons why party affiliations 
should affect the expectations of constituents in Great Britain more 
so than in the U. S. The party system is clearly stronger in the 
mother country, both in organizational terms, and as a factor which 
structures all aspects of the voting decision. 19 Even so, the 
differences evident in Table 4 may arise from more mundane considerations. 
In Britain a majority of MP's hold their surgeries in local party 
headquarters. Thus, constituents who belong to opposing parties must 
bear the extra psychological cost of requesting assistance while 
physically on the enemy's "turf" so to speak. 20 American Congressmen 
in contrast generally have constituency off ices distinct from party 
facilities, often in official government buildings. 
Other than the effects of party identification the influences 
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o n  expectations of incumbent helpfulness in Great Britain are similar 
to those in the United States. Citizen initiated contacts are very 
important -- both personal and secondhand. But in contrast to the 
American case the positive impact of secondhand contacts appears 
comparable to that of personal ones, and the negative impact of 
secondhand contacts is statistically uncertain. 21 Previous incumbent 
service to the district produces favorable expectations for the future. 
And finally, the variety of means MP's use to communicate with 
constituents contribute to favorable expectations, though name recall 
has no independent effect. 
There are inter-country differences in the marginal 
distributions of variables, of course, but for the most part these are 
not so large as one might have anticipated. For example, as mentioned 
previously, 20 percent of the American sample remembers "something 
special" the Congressman has done for the district. The comparable 
figure in the British sample is 1 3  percent, lower, to be sure, but 
relatively high given the MP's lack of committee-based personal power. 
Similarly, 22 percent of the American sample reports some type of 
personal contact (met, heard in person, talked to member or staff) . 
The (very) comparable figure in Great Britain is 18 percent. Perhaps 
the MP's disadvantage insofar as resources of office are concerned is 
counter-balanced by the smaller (geographically and numerically) 
districts. Or, it may be the case that backbench MP's have more time 
to meet with constituents. 
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Job Performance 
Finally, we come back to the question with which we began 
this paper : why do citizen's rate their legislators so highly? 
Table 5 contains the estimates for the job performance equations. In 
order to maximize comparability we have estimated both equations with 
the name recall item. If the recognition item is substituted in the 
American equation, its value is . 50 (p < .01) , but the other coefficients 
and the overall performance of the equation are virtually unaffected 
(even less so than in Table 4, equation 1 and 2 ) .  Thus, i n  what 
follows we will at times refer to effects which occur through name 
recognition even though the equation using recall is the one reported. 
[Table 5 here] 
When combined with the relationships already estimated 
Table 5 sUI11111arizes a web of influences. In the .American case 
appraisals of the incumbent's voting record have a strong impact on 
performance evaluations, both directly, and one should bear in mind, 
through name recognition and the formation of positive expectations 
about the incumbent's helpfulness, both of which relate very strongly 
to performance ratings. Somewhat less important but still showing 
direct as well as indirect influence on performance ratings are contacts 
and district service. Only one citizen-initiated contact coefficient 
remains significant in the performance rating equation. Thus, the 
effects of congressional service efforts appear to take place primarily 
through name recognition and/or the formation of positive expectations. 
All in all this congeries of direct and indirect effects is more 
consistent with the subtler ideas of Fenno than the simpler accusations 
of CollUllon Cause. 22 
TABLE S 
INCUKBENT JOB RATINGS, UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 
Name Recall (Recognition) 
Personal Contact 
Impersonal Contact 
Secondhand Contact 
Citizen­
Initiated 
Contacts 
Secondhand 
Citizen­
Initiated 
Contacts 
{Very Satisfied 
SW Satisfied 
Not Satisfied 
{Very Satisfied 
SW Satisfied 
Not Satisfied 
District Service 
Voting 
Record 
Expectation 
of 
Helpfulness 
{Approve 
SW Approve 
Neutral 
Disapprove 
{Very Helpful 
SW Helpful 
DK Helpful 
Depends 
Carter or 
Callaghan 
Performance 
{Very 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
DK 
Good 
Congress or 
Parliment 
Performance 
Independent 
No Party ID 
Other Party ID 
Same Party ID 
R.2 
rho 
D 
{Very Good 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
DK 
United States 
.07 (.SO**) 
.lS* 
.23** 
.23* 
.08 
-.16 
.08 
-.11 
-.35t 
.37** 
1.20** 
.35** 
-.17* 
-LOS** 
1. 70** 
.91** 
.61** 
.41* 
.OS 
-.06 
-.04 
. 33 
1.11** 
.60** 
.33** 
.16 
.40** 
.13 
.09 
.54 
.62 
1,568 
Great Britain 
.07 
.15* 
.18** 
.08 
.37** 
.11 
-.11 
.40** 
-.34 
-1.02** 
.48** 
1.52** 
. 79** 
.64** 
• 78** 
.67** 
.SO** 
.34* 
.44** 
.29t 
.32t 
.3S* 
.15 
.03 
.23t 
.11 
-.05 
.32** 
.40 
.53 
1,240 
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Let us turn now to the question of collective responsibility 
and its impact on evaluations of individual members. Again, common 
party affiliation
-
makes no difference; so far as evaluations of 
incumbents are concerned party identification must work only in 
roundabout ways if at all. Moreover, if we look at the embodiment of 
the party in power the President -- we see only a slight impact of 
his rating on member evaluations . The picture is somewhat more 
positive insofar as institutional performance is concerned: member 
evaluations do bear a significant relationship to institutional 
evaluations. Individuals do not completely escape the negative images 
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produced by "running against Congress . "  
The British equation displays both similarities and contrasts 
when compared to the American. Contacts work in about the same way 
as in the American data, but there appears to be some difference in 
the direct importance of secondhand accounts of citizen initiated 
contacts. Perhaps something about the British social structure lends 
greater credence to word of mouth reports . On the other hand, 
expectations that the MP would help in a pinch are similarly and 
strongly related to performance in both countries. So is knowledge of 
"something special" the legislator has done for the district. This 
variable, in fact, has a statistically significant effect in every 
equation we have estimated. These cross national similarities (as 
well as those in Tables 3 and 4) are important in that they belie the 
conventional wisdom concerning the qualitative difference between 
MP's and MC's. The institutional contexts the legislators inhabit 
differ greatly, but the data indicate that constituent perceptions 
and evaluations are considerably more similar than the differing 
24 contexts might suggest. 
Similarities aside, we do see in Table 5 an expected type 
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of dissimilarity -- that concerning the party responsibility of the 
members. In Britain partisanship structures incumbent performance 
ratings to a greater extent than in the United States. The coefficient 
of "Same Party ID" in Britain is highly significant and more than three 
times larger than the insignificant United States coefficient. 
Moreover, consider the relative impact of Jimmy Carter and James 
Callaghan evaluations on the ratings of their respective legislative 
party colleagues. The former matter hardly at all while the latter 
matter a good deal. The situation in contemporary Britain resembles 
an earlier era in the United States -- one analyzed by Tufte and 
Kernell -- an era in which Congressmen had a personal electoral 
incentive to see a President of their party perform well, or at least 
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to present that appearance. Our estimations are consistent with 
the argument that a large part of Carter's purported inability to 
to lead Congress simply reflects contemporary Congressional perceptions 
that their electoral fates are virtually unconnected to his, common 
party affiliation or not. 
Interestingly, however, judgments about the collective 
performance of Parliament appear relatively unimportant in Great 
Britain. There may be less here than meets the eye, however. In the 
United States ratings of Carter and Congress have little in common 
(y = .29) . As would one expect, though, Callaghan and Parliament 
ratings are considerably more inter-linked (y = . 74) . Thus, in the 
British equation Callaghan ratings aope·1r to incorporate both executive 
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and legislative performance evaluations whereas the two are legitimately 
independent variables in the American equation. 
Conclusion 
How then can an American or British legislator maintain his 
or her popularity? Though the answer varies somewhat between the two 
countries the similarities are striking and important. In both 
countries, legislators can insulate themselves from unfavorable national 
forces by attending district functions, regularly seeking publicity, 
diligently doing casework , and protecting the special interests of the 
constituency. These activities, of course, mean slightly different 
things in America and Great Britain. To a Congressman, doing casework 
means establishing district offices and diverting staff resources to 
constituent problems, whereas to an MP ,  doing casework means dealing 
personally with constituent problems. In the United States , protecting 
the district means working to secure projects and programs , whereas in 
Great Britain , protecting the constituency means intervening in 
government or bureaucratic decisions on behalf of the constituency 
by means of delegations , lobbying the minister and publicity. 
While the institutional setting alters the exact method by 
which legislators protect their constituents, the logic underlying 
this behavior is the same in both countries. District or constituency-
oriented activities are an uncontroversial means of securing a reliable 
base of local support. That legislators in both countries should do 
this is not surprising. Both MPs and Congressmen are elected under 
single-member, simple plurality rule: in each case they are their 
districts's unique representative. Furthermore, for a variety of 
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reasons both the MP and the Congressman have the opportunity to confer 
benefits on their constituents.
26 Thus legislators in both countries 
have a substantial incentive (traceable to the electoral system) to 
engage in the activities associated with protecting the constituency, 
and at least some capacity to do so. 
In addition, the need for legislators on both sides of the 
Atlantic to insulate themselves from adverse national forces has 
grown in recent years. The failure of successive governments to resolve 
complex economic problems, and the fading attraction of the American 
New Deal and British class alignments, have made voters less loyal and 
less predictable. Increasingly legislators respond by attempting to 
construct personal constituencies capable of withstanding the vagaries 
of national issues and personalities. 
While our estimations show that constituency work serves 
this buffer function in both countries , they show too that British MPs 
are more closely tied to voters' evaluations of the national parties 
and the government. Consequently, MPs are less successful in protecting 
themselves from adverse national swings. In the future, though , MPs 
may become more successful at insulating themselves from national 
forces if such trends as that towards increased cross party voting 
continue, or if institutional reforms such as the new committee system 
give MPs greater legislative independence and personal power. Such 
developments would make the British situation resemble the American 
one more than it presently does. In fact, to conclude on a speculative 
note, the British too, may contact the "American disease" of inchoate 
parties and incoherent politics. 
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As mentioned earlier, 40 percent of the American sample recognizes 
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of both. If one looks only at races contested by incumbents, the 
figures are even more striking . Over 80 percent of the sample 
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name recall as a filter in the 1958 study. 
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from incumbent (SO percent, 16 percent, 34 percent respectively) . 
In the British sample all constituents fall into the classes, 
same party as incumbent, no party ID indicated, opposite party 
f rom incumbent ( 38 percent, 18 percent, 42 percent respectively) . 
(British Gallup does not probe the "no party" respondents in a 
manner parallel to the CPS probes in independents. )  In some of 
what follows we will include an extra term in the British equations 
to represent any special effects of splinter party identification, 
e. g. nationalists. 
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18. The reader should harbor no suspicions, incidentally, that this 
inter-country difference is an artifact of the presence in the 
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though not so much so as in the American sample. The distribution 
of responses across the categories "very satisfactory, " "somewhat 
satisfactory, " "not very satisfactory" and "not at all satisfactory" 
is 79 , 34 , 13,  14 . 
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APPENDIX 
Many of the variables employed in this paper were constructed 
from the following survey items newly designed for the 1978 NES/CPS 
Congressional Elections S tudy. These were modified in the obvious ways 
for use in Great Britain. 
Contacts 
There are many ways in which (U . S .  Representatives , MPs) 
can have contact with the people from their distric t s .  O n  this page 
are some of these ways. Think o f  who has been the 
(U . S .  Representative , MP) from this district . Have you come into 
contact with or learned anything about him/her through any of these 
ways? (Yes , no) . 
Met him/her. 
Attended a meeting or gathering where he/she spok e .  
Talked to a member of his/her staff ' o r  someone in his/her office. 
Received something in the mail from him/her. 
Read about him/her in a newspaper or magazine . 
Heard him/her on the radio . 
Saw him/her on lV .
Secondhand Contacts 
Do you know o f  anyone, any of your family , friends, or 
people at work who have had some contact with (name of Representat ive 
or MP) ? 
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Citizen Initiated Contacts 
Have you (or anyone in your family living here) ever contacted 
(name of Representative or MP) or anyone in his/her office? If yes , 
was it to -
Express an opinion. 
Seek informat ion. 
Seek help on a problem you had . 
Did you get a response from your (Representative , MP) or his/her office? 
How satisfied were you with the respons e :  very satisfied, somewhat 
satisfied , not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied? 
Secondhand Cit izen Initiated Contacts 
Do you know anyone else who has contacted (name o f  
Representative or MP )  o r  anyone i n  his/her o ffice? If yes ,  did this 
(person/group) get a response? If yes, was this (person/group) 
satisfied with the response? 
Yes , satisfied . 
Somewhat satisfied . 
Somewhat dissatisfied . 
No, not satisfied . 
Expectation o f  Access 
If you had another problem that (name o f  Representative 
or MP) could do something about , do you think that he/she would b e  
very helpful , somewhat helpful, or n o t  very helpful to you? 
District Service 
Do you happen to remember anything special that your 
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(U . S .  Representative, MP) has done for this district or for the people 
in this district while he/she has been in (Congress , Parliament) ? 
Voting Record (U . S .  only) 
Now we would like to know how much you generally agree or 
disagree with the way (name of incumbent) has voted on b ills that have 
come up in the U . S .  House of Representatives in Washington . Looking 
at this list would you say you agree, agree somewhat , neither agree 
nor disagree, disagree somewhat ,  or disagree with the way he/she has 
voted on bills, or haven' t you thought much about this? 
Legislat ive Roles 
Here is a list of some of the activities that occupy members 
of the (U. S .  House, Parliament )  as part of their j ob .  We want to 
know how you feel about the importance (Representatives , MPs) should 
give these activities . I ' ll stop for a moment while you read this l is t ,  
and then I ' ll ask you t o  rank the activities i n  order of importance . 
U . S .  - Helping people in the district who have personal 
problems with the government . 
Making sure the dis trict gets its fair share of 
government money and proj ects . 
Keeping track of the way government agencies are 
carrying out laws passed by Congress .  
Keeping in touch with the people about what the 
government is doing . 
Working in Congress on bills concerning national 
issues . 
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G.B. - Helping people .  
Protecting interests o f  constituency. 
Keeping track of civil servants . 
Keeping in touch . 
Debating and voting . 
